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CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw-FotmTEENTII AMENl>MENT-D1scruMINATION IN
SELECTION OF GRAND JtmoRs-Defendant's conviction of murder was affirmed
by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, which rejected defendant's claim that
discrimination in selection of the indicting grand jury had violated his constitutional rights. Defendant pointed out that the Negro proportion of grand
jurors had uniformly been less than the ratio of Negroes to the total population of the county, and that on the past twenty-one lists the commissioners had
consistently limited the number of Negroes to not more than one on each
grand jury. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, reversed.
Limitation of the number of Negroes on a grand jury to the approximate proportion of Negroes in the county eligible for grand jury service would constitute
unconstitutional discrimination in violation of the rights of a member of that
race against whom an indictment was returned by the grand jury so selected,
since the accused is entitled to have charges against him considered by a grand
jury in the selection of which there is neither inclusion nor exclusion because of
race. Intentional exclusion proved by the statements of the commissioners that
they chose for service only those whom they knew and that they knew no eligible
Negroes was the actual discrimination on which the unconstitutionality was
based. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 70 S.Ct. 629 (1950).
The principal case is the third in a group of Supreme Court decisions dealing with alleged discrimination in the selection of grand jurors in Texas. In the
Hill case1 the Court unanimously held that a case of prima facie discrimination
was established by the proof of the fact that no Negroes had ever served on a Dallas
County grand jury plus the fact that the commissioners admittedly had made no
effort to determine whether there were any eligible Negroes. Two years later
in the Akins case,2 the defendant contended that the commissioners deliberately
limited Negroes in grand jury service to one on each grand jury. The majority
of the Court thought the evidence did not show such deliberate limitation.
Justice Reed, therefore, avoided the question of whether purposeful limitation
of Negroes selected for grand jury service to the approximate proportion of
Negroes eligible for such service in the county would be unconstitutional under
the Fourteenth Amendment. 3 In the principal case, defendant contended that
in his county the Akins decision had been interpreted to allow limitation of the
number of Negroes on each grand jury in approximate proportion to the number
of Negroes eligible for service. Justice Reed, therefore, discusses at some length
the question left unanswered in the Akins case. The Court thought that such
limitation was as much discrimination as complete exclusion of Negroes from
grand jury service, and that, since it would be impossible to meet such a proportionate requirement for all races and nationalities present in the ancestry of
1

Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 62 S.Ct. 1159 (1942).

2 Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 65 S.Ct. 1276 (1945).
3 Id. at 407. The Court stated that fairness in the selection

of jurymen had never been
held to require proportional representation of races upon a jury, citing Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313 (1879); Thomas v. Texas, 212 U.S. 278, 29 S.Ct. 393 (1909) ..
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Americans, it would be manifestly unfair so to limit one race. 4 In a ·vehement
dissent in the principal case, Justice Jackson points out what he deems the
lack of logic in the majority opinion. While agreeing that the Court must enforce racial equality in the judicial system, Justice Jackson believes that no conviction should be set aside for errors not affecting substantial rights of the accused. Justice Jackson's position is that a substantial right is involved, but that
it is a right of the Negroes excluded from jury service, not of the accused. 5 He
dismisses as untenable the two reasons usually advanced for giving this right to
the accused, viz., that this is the only practical way to enforce the right and that
the accused would otherwise suffer lack of due process, and points out that there
are both civil and criminal penalties provided by statute against those who so
discriminate. 6 These have been largely neglected since 1878,7 but could be invoked by Negroes excluded from grand jury service. Furthermore, it is difficult
for Justice Jackson to see how there can be a violation of due process merely
because of discrimination in the selection of the grand jury which indicts an
accused, if he is tried and convicted by a trial jury selected without discrimination.8 Although one cannot but agree with Justice Reed that a purposeful limitation of Negroes allowed to serve on a grand jury to the proportion of eligible
Negroes in the county is discrimination against the race and should not be tolerated, Justice Jackson's opinion seems much more sound in its contention that
the right to be selected for grand jury service without regard to race belongs to
the excluded Negroes, not to the accused.

Alan C. Boyd, S.Ed.

4 Justice Reed here speaks in terms of discrimination against members of the Negro
race, rather than against the accused. This is in accord with the reasoning of the dissent
that the right to have grand jurors selected without regard to race belongs to Negroes excluded from jury service. Justice Reed, however, illogically uses this reasoning to sustain
the position that the right belongs to the accused. Principal case at 631-632.
5 Principal case at 638.
6 18 u.s.c. (1947) §243; 8 u.s.c. (1947) §43.
7fu: parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879).
s Justice· Clark agreed with Justice Jackson that discrimination in the selection of grand
jurymen did not justify reversal of a conviction, but he concurred with Justice Reed's opinion because he thought it was better that the Court follow a settled course.

